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I. INTRODUCTION

“Hey, hey, what do you say? We demand fair pay.”1 More than 200 fast food
restaurant employees chanted this statement on November 29, 2012 in New York
City in an attempt to raise awareness of their inability to live above the poverty
2
line with their current wages. The demonstration marked the beginning of a
nationwide campaign to raise wages and obtain union rights for employees of
3
franchises such as McDonald’s and Burger King. Employees of McDonald’s
franchisees made the company the center of current litigation, however, as
employees alleged multiple instances of unfair labor practices against
4
McDonald’s in contravention of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Case
precedent shows that only franchisees, as opposed to franchisors, could be
responsible for unfair labor practices in any franchise agreement, as they exercise
5
immediate control over their employees. Such claims of franchisee control
originally made the employees’ cases against McDonald’s as a franchise appear
6
weak. However, on July 29, 2014, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
1. Steven Greenhouse, With Day of Protests, Fast Food Workers Seek More Pay, N.Y TIMES (Nov. 29,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/30/nyregion/fast-food-workers-in-new-york-city-rally-for-higher-wage
s.html?_r=0 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. Id.
3. Jay-Anne Casuga, NLRB General Counsel Issues 13 Complaints Alleging McDonald’s Jointly Liable
for ULPs, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 2, 2015), http://0-laborandemploymentlaw.bna.com.gocat.law.pacific.edu/
lerc/2445/split_display.adp?fedfid=60620598&vname=lecbnnews&wsn=499758500&searchid=24191921&doc
typeid=5&type=date&mode=doc&split=0&scm=2445&pg=0 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
4. See MCDONALD’S FACT SHEET, NAT’L LAB. REL. BD., available at http://www.nlrb.gov/newsoutreach/ fact-sheets/mcdonalds-fact-sheet (last visited Dec. 27, 2014) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (showing multiple complaints issued against McDonald’s for violations of the NLRA).
5. See Amicus Brief of General Counsel, Browning-Ferris Indus. (N.L.R.B. 2014) (Case No. 32-RC109684) [hereinafter Amicus Brief of General Counsel] (stating that under the current joint employer definition,
franchisors are not held liable for labor violations of their franchisees employees).
6. See Allen Smith, NLRB General Counsel: McDonald’s is Joint Employer with Franchisees, SOC’Y FOR
HUMAN RES. MGMT. (July 30, 2014), http://www.shrm.org/legalissues/federalresources/pages/nlrb-joint-
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ruled that for the purpose of the employees’ cases, McDonald’s should be
7
considered a joint employer with its franchisees. The decision brought about
much controversy, especially in light of the fact that the NLRB did not give any
8
9
legal justification for its decision to make McDonald’s a joint employer.
The Service Employees International Union (SEIU) assisted in the execution
of these protests and believes the NLRB decision to find McDonald’s as a joint
employer in cases associated with the protests will make it easier to unionize
10
employees of franchisees. It is possible for workers to unionize within their
franchise against the respective franchise owners (the franchisee), but generally,
this is not as effective for multiple reasons: (1) the strategies the SEIU uses are
not as effective with small business owners; (2) with over 3,000 independently
owned franchises, the cost of organizing each individual unit generally outweighs
the benefits—there are over 3,000 independently owned franchises, generally
making the cost of organizing each individual unit outweigh the benefits; and (3)
because McDonald’s exerts so much control over its franchisees, company
protocol constrains management at local franchises and leaves them without
11
discretion to change their employees’ wages and benefits. The SEIU stated that
a broader definition of “joint employer” will make it easier to organize
12
employees of franchises into unions. The Board’s recent holding in Browningemployers.aspx (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (The ruling by the NLRB’s Division of
Advice asserting that McDonald’s Corp. is a ‘joint employer’ of its franchisees’ employees overturns 30 years
of established law regarding the franchise model in the United States.”).
7. Office of Public Affairs, NLRB Office of the General Counsel Authorizes Complaints against
McDonald’s Franchisees and Determines McDonald’s, USA, LLC is a Joint Employer, NAT’L LAB. REL. BD.
(Jul. 29, 2014), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-office-general-counselauthorizes-complaints-against-mcdonalds [hereinafter NLRB General Counsel Authorizes Complaints] (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
8. However, a recent opinion, Browning-Ferris Industries, __N.L.R.B.__, Case 32-RC-109684 (2015),
held that it would be overruling the stricter definition of “joint employer” and implements a “joint employer”
standard that is easier to fulfill. The decision outlines reasons for the return to a broader interpretation of “joint
employer” and is discussed in Part IV.C of this Comment. Browning-Ferris came out approximately one year
after the Board announced that it would hold McDonald’s as a “joint employer” for the purposes of these
decisions.
9. Jeffrey Dorfman, McDonald’s Ruling by NLRB Counsel Puts SEIU’s Unionization Goal within Reach,
FORBES (July 30, 2014), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffreydorfman/2014/07/30/mcdonaldsruling-by-nlrb-counsel-puts-seius-unionization-goal-within-reach/ (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review); see NLRB General Counsel Authorizes Complaints, supra note 7 (stating that the NLRB will
consider McDonald’s a joint employer).
10. Id.
11. Amicus Brief of General Counsel, supra note 5, at 14–15; See James Sherk, Unions for Big
Businesses, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 4, 2014), available at http://www.nationalreview.com/article/384453/unions-bigbusinesses-james-sherk (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining franchisees handle
all hiring and employment).
12. See Ben Penn, To Unions, McDonald’s Joint Employer Status No Slam Dunk, as Fast Food Push
Intensifies, DAILY LAB. REP. (Sept. 18, 2014), available at http://www.bna.com/unions-mcdonalds-jointn17179895030/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (stating “[a] more liberal NLRB joint
employer definition could put franchisors in the situation of having to bargain on behalf of franchisees,” which
the current standard does not require).
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Ferris, which signaled the return of a broader joint employer standard, only
13
reaffirmed the SEIU’s hopes for unionization efforts.
However, the SEIU’s optimism is not well-founded. The joint employer
14
analysis calls for a case-by-case examination of the franchisor-franchisee
15
relationship. Because the definition of joint employer requires a case-by-case
analysis of relevant facts, unions such as those the SEIU created will have to
independently establish a joint employer relationship with each franchise before
16
they can unionize all employees working for McDonald’s. Although
McDonald’s has uniform standardized contracts with its franchisees, case
precedent does not make it easy for other franchisees to establish a joint
17
employer relationship with their franchisors. Unionizing employees will still
have the burden of showing that there are no franchise-to-franchise distinctions
large enough to warrant an individual review of the relationships between
18
particular franchisees and McDonald’s. McDonald’s has a substantial interest in
preventing case precedent that establishes a joint employer relationship with a
franchisee, and will work hard to prevent courts from recognizing that
19
relationship. The court’s declaration of a joint employer relationship is
important to unions because McDonald’s is only legally bound by the provisions
20
of the NLRA if they it is a joint employer with its franchisees. Therefore, under
any case-by-case analysis standard, the SEIU will not be able to effectively
unionize McDonald’s franchisee’s employees; instead, courts should incorporate
21
a new doctrine in which they perform a franchise-by-franchise analysis: once a
franchisor is determined to be a joint employer with any one of its franchisees, a
joint employer relationship is established between the franchisor and all of its
franchisees.

13. Noam Scheiber & Stephanie Strom, Labor Board Ruling Eases Way for Fast-Food Union’s Efforts,
N.Y. Times (Aug. 27, 2015), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/28/business/labor-board-saysfranchise-workers-can-bargain-with-parent-company.html?_r=0 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
14. See Browning-Ferris Industries, __ N.L.R.B. __, Case 32-RC-109684, 1, 18–20 (stating that each
case presents “material issues”).
15. Infra Part IV.C.
16. Infra Part IV.C.
17. Infra Part IV.C.
18. See TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798 (1984) (requiring the moving party to establish a joint employer
relationship).
19. See Melanie Trottman & Julie Jargon, NLRB Names McDonald’s as ‘Joint-Employer’ at Its
Franchisees, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2014), available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/nlrb-names-mcdonalds-asjoint-employer-of-workers-at-its-franchisees-1419018664 (stating that McDonald’s plans to contest the joint
employer allegations against them as they are improperly placed).
20. See Raymond G. McGuire, The Labor Law Aspects of Franchising, 13 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV.
215, 239 (1972) (“Whether the franchisor will be characterized as an employer of the interest group which the
union seeks to represent.”).
21. See infra Part V.
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This Comment will establish the necessity of a franchise-by-franchise
doctrine by first analyzing the NLRA. Part II discusses the policy goals of the
22
NLRA, both in its initial enactment and with the Taft-Hartley amendment. Part
III will explain the current business-format model of the franchise, whether
employees of franchisees were a likely class of persons the NLRA meant to
protect, and why the current business-format model does not allow employees to
23
receive their established rights under the NLRA. Part IV will develop the
history of the term “joint employer” and conclude that despite a broader
interpretation of the joint employer standard, the implementation of the current
joint employer doctrine still does not adequately protect collective bargaining
24
rights of employees of franchisees. Part V will examine proposals sent to the
Board by the General Counsel suggesting a return to the broader definition of
25
joint employer developed in the 1950s. This Comment will then conclude that
the only way employees of franchisees’ rights under the NLRA can be fully
26
realized is through the courts’ application of a franchise-by-franchise analysis.
II. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
Congress enacted the NLRA―also known as the Wagner Act―in part to
27
28
decrease the number of strikes that were obstructing interstate commerce.
Congress believed that meaningful collective bargaining for employees would
scale back the strikes—the larger an employee’s voice in employment
29
negotiations, the less reason they had to strike. However, in 1947, the TaftHartley Act amended the NLRA and imposed restrictions on union practices,
causing courts and the NLRB to question whether unions promoted or obstructed
30
interstate commerce. An in-depth analysis of the Taft-Hartley Act shows that
the amendments do not change the original policy of the NLRA, and that
31
meaningful collective bargaining is still an essential employee right.

22. Infra Part II.
23. Infra Part III.
24. Infra Part IV.
25. Id.
26. Infra Part V.
27. The strikes were mainly to gain recognition of labor unions, which in turn would help end the
deplorable working conditions during that time (low wages and long hours). Florence Peterson, Review of
Strikes in the United States, 46 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1047, 1059–60 (1938).
28. See infra Part II.B.
29. See infra Part II.B.
30. See infra Part II.C.1.
31. See infra Part II.C.2.
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A. A Brief Overview of the NLRA
“Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 to protect the
rights of employees and employers, to encourage collective bargaining, and to
curtail certain private sector labor and management practices, which can harm the
32
general welfare of workers, businesses and the U.S. economy.” Proponents of
the NLRA envisioned that the Act would give employees means to collectively
33
bargain with employers and create a system of self-governance.
1. The Board and General Counsel
The NLRA established the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) to
34
help enforce the NLRA. The President appoints five members to the Board, and
35
the Senate approves the President’s selections. The Board has the power to
36
examine issues employees present alleging unfair labor practices. After a
hearing, if the Board finds that a preponderance of the evidence shows that the
employer violated fair labor practices, it can issue an order requiring desistance
37
of the behavior. Non-compliance with board decisions triggers a review by the
United States District Court or direct review by the United States Court of
38
Appeals.

32. National Labor Relations Act, NAT’L LAB. REL. BD., http://www.nlrb.gov/resources/national-laborrelations-act (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) [hereinafter National Labor Relations Act] (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).
33. See Leon H. Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Origin and Current Significance, 29 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 199, 218 (1960) (explaining that the NLRA meant more to Wagner than simply negating industrial strife).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2014).
35. Id.
36. Id. at § 160 (unfair labor practices include any violation listed in § 158); see also id. at § 158 (listing
unfair labor practices such as: interfering with employees right to self-organization, join unions, or bargain
collectively through representatives; interfering with the formation or administration of labor organizations;
hiring employees on the basis of whether they are or are not in a union . . . etc.).
37. Id. at § 160.
38. The case can be brought “in any United States court of appeals in the circuit wherein the unfair labor
practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such person resides or transactions
business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.” Id.
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2. Rights of Employees and Employers and Unfair Labor Practices
39

The NLRA establishes the rights of employees as follows:
[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted actives for the
40
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
41
employment as authorized [in section 158 of this title].
42

The NLRA then lists five employer actions that are considered unfair labor
practices under the Act: (1) interfering with the employee’s granted rights, as
stated above; (2) interfering with “formation or administration of any labor
organization or contribut[ing] financial or other support to it;” (3) “discrimination
in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor

39. The NLRA defines “employee” as:
[A]ny employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the
Act . . . explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a
consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor
practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment,
but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic
service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse,
or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a
supervisor, or any individual employed by an en employer subject to the Railway Labor Act . . .
or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.
Id. at § 152. It is important to note that the Taft-Hartley Act restricted the definition of employee by adding “or
any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor” to
those groups explicitly excluded from the definition of employer. Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1947). Others argue that courts had already dissociated
these categories of employees from protection under the NLRA. Robert J. Rosenthal, Exclusions of Employees
under the Taft-Hartley Act, 4 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 556, 559, 565 (1951).
40. Under the Wagner Act, the text preceding this footnote represented the complete section of the Rights
of Employees; the Taft-Hartley Act amended this section by adding the right to refrain from activities. 1947
Taft-Hartley Substantive Provisions, NAT’L LAB. REL. BD., available at http://www.nlrb.gov/resources/
national-labor-relations-act (last visited Jan. 1, 2014) [hereinafter 1947 Taft-Hartley Substantive Provisions] (on
file with The University of Pacific Law Review).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2014).
42. An employer is defined in the NLRA as “any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or
indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal
Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act.” Id.
at § 152. This comment analyzes the meaning of employer, more specifically of joint employer, in Part III,
infra.
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organization;” (4) “to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee
because he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act;” and (5)
44
“refus[ing] to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees.”
45
The NLRA also restricts “unfair labor practices by labor organization[s].”
There are seven practices that union organizations cannot engage in: (1)
compelling employees to exercise rights guaranteed by the NLRA; (2) trying to
make an employer discriminate against an employee because they are not part of
a union; (3) “refus[ing] to bargain collectively with an employer;” (4)
participating in or encouraging strikes; (5) requiring excessive payments by
employees; (6) coercing employers to pay for services not received; and (7)
negotiations must be with certified representatives when employees threaten to
46
strike based on disregard of the representative by the employer.
B. The National Industrial Recovery Act: The NLRA’s Predecessor
The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) was enacted before the NLRA,
47
and Senator Wagner intended the NLRA to be modeled after the NIRA. The
48
NIRA’s failures shaped the stated purpose of the NLRA.
During the Great Depression, supporters of the New Deal undertook various
49
means to help boost the economy. Congress enacted the NLRA only after the
50
Supreme Court found its predecessor, the NIRA, unconstitutional. Although
both the NIRA and the NLRA encourage union organizing, the Acts had different
51
stated purposes. Congress enacted the NIRA with the purpose of harmonizing a
52
balance of production and consumption. Proponents of the NIRA believed
economic problems arose because workers who produced goods did not have
53
enough money to purchase them. This resulted in a market imbalance: a high

43. The Act makes various exceptions that allow employers to make agreements with unions under
certain conditions. Id. at § 158.
44. Id.
45. It is important to note that these violations were not part of the original Wagner Act, but were added
by the Taft Hartley Act. 1947 Taft-Hartley Substantive Provisions, supra note 40. This is discussed in more
detail in Part II.C of this comment.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 158.
47. See E.G. Latham, Legislative Purpose and Administrative Policy under the National Labor Relations
Act, 4 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 433, 434–39 (1936) (discussing the history of legislation that led to the enactment of
the NLRA).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 541–42, 549.
51. Id. at 443.
52. LEVERETT S. LYON, ET AL., THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION: AN ANALYSIS AND
APPRAISAL 5 (1935).
53. Id. at 6.
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number of goods available for purchase, but few consumers capable of
54
purchasing the goods.
Part of the NIRA was aimed at stabilizing this imbalance by giving workers
broader collective bargaining rights, thereby giving them higher salaries and
55
greater purchasing power. However, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v.
United States found the NIRA unconstitutional because it granted legislative
powers to the executive branch and extended federal power beyond that granted
56
to Congress under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court found the link
between interstate commerce and the NIRA too attenuated and therefore outside
57
the power of the Commerce Clause, making the NIRA unconstitutional.
Congress enacted the NIRA with an expiration date and it contained many
58
deficiencies that prompted Senator Wagner to propose similar legislation—the
59
NLRA. Senator Wagner completed the legislation and presented it to Congress
60
before the Schechter decision. Wagner originally stated two purposes of the
NLRA. The first and main purpose mirrored the NIRA: to keep balance in
61
workers’ wages and the amount of goods produced. The second purpose was to
62
limit strikes that obstructed interstate commerce. However, in light of the
Schechter decision and the NIRA’s unconstitutionality, Congress shifted the
primary focus of the NLRA to the second reason in order to demonstrate a more
63
direct effect on interstate commerce and ensure the NLRA’s constitutionality. In
1937, the Supreme Court declared the NLRA constitutional in N.L.R.B. v. Jones
64
& Laughlin Steel Corp.
C. How the NIRA’s Policy Affected the Purpose of the NLRA
Despite Congress stating the primary purpose of the NLRA was to prevent
strikes, Wagner often said the purpose of the NLRA is “to make the worker a free
65
man.” The NLRA enabled workers to live in an industrial democracy, bargain
for rights, and establish alternatives other than compliance with decisions of the

54. Id.
55. See Latham, supra note 47, at 441 (explaining section 7(a) of the NLRA).
56. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42, 549 (1935).
57. Id.
58. See Theda Skocpol et al., Explaining New Deal Labor Policy, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1297, 1301
(1990) (stating that NIRA policies were difficult to enforce).
59. Id.
60. Latham, supra note 47, at 440.
61. Id. at 442–43.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 443.
64. N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30–31(1937).
65. Keyserling, supra note 33, at 215.
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66

industrialist bourgeoisie. However, according to Leon Keyserling, Senator
Wagner’s legislative assistant, “[Wagner] never valued the [NLRA] primarily as
a mere weapon for negating industrial strife, but rather as an affirmative vehicle
for the economic and related social progress to which his life-long efforts were
67
devoted.” This purpose aligns with that of the NIRA, and, despite the
shortcomings that caused Congress to shift its primary purposes for enacting the
NLRA, Wagner still believed in the original purpose of the NIRA and attributed
68
its failures to faulty administration.
Wagner and other NLRA drafters who had worked on the NIRA took many
ideas that were not successfully executed under that legislation and inserted them
69
into the NLRA. The NLRA provided procedures for the Board to successfully
70
enforce its decisions. This demonstrates that Wagner’s focus while securing the
enactment of the NLRA centered on crafting a long-term solution to regulate
71
interstate commerce by giving workers a voice in employment negotiations.
Empowering workers decreases the necessity for strikes that interrupt the flow of
72
business. Further by giving workers a voice in negotiations, their economic
leverage is heightened, which helps balance consumer purchasing power with the
73
amount of goods available on the market. The remedy in section 10(a) of the
NLRA furthers Wagner’s view by empowering the Board “to prevent any person
from engaging in any unfair labor practice [listed in the NLRA] affecting
74
commerce.”
Therefore, it appears that the purpose of the NLRA is a combination of two
goals. The first is to develop a self-governing industry, one where workers are
not forced to work in an economy with employers fixing wages and benefits
75
without representation of their employees’ needs. The second is to stabilize
interstate commerce through means of ensuring communicative measures other

66. See Ellen Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
223, 229–30 (2005) (“NLRA policies set out steps to make workplaces more democratic and to empower
workers by giving them the skills to be citizens of a democracy”).
67. Keyserling, supra note 33, at 218.
68. Id. at 219.
69. See Skocpol, et al., supra note 58, at 1301 (stating that many legislators who worked on the NIRA
also helped draft the NLRA, imposing many of the same ideals in both).
70. See id. (stating that NIRA policies were difficult to enforce).
71. See Keyserling, supra note 33, at 220–21 (stating that Wagner “foresaw that this process within our
enterprise system could become an integral part of a . . . larger cooperative process guided by intelligence which
would animate the whole economy).
72. See Cox, supra note 39, at 2–3 (“Employer interference with employee organization and denials of
recognition were prime causes of industrial disputes.”).
73. See Keyserling, supra note 33, at 218–19 (quoting Senator Wagner stating “[a]s profits rose faster
than wages, the excess earnings were invested in more factories, turning out an ever-increasing volume of
goods”).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2014).
75. Supra Part II.A.
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than strikes, and preserve harmony in the economy by keeping employee wages
76
high enough to allow employees to purchase goods.
D. The Taft-Hartley Amendment and its Effect on the NLRA
77

In 1947, Congress amended the NLRA by passing the Taft-Hartley Act. The
78
Taft-Hartley Act has created confusion regarding the purpose of the NLRA
because Congress enacted it with the intent of narrowing union organizations’
79
power. There are two major changes the Taft-Hartley Act made to the Wagner
Act: first, the declaration of purpose, and second, the addition of unfair labor
80
practices by labor organizations.
1. Change in Declaration and Findings Clause
The Taft-Hartley Act did not change the original Wagner Act declaration
81
stressing the importance of collective bargaining; however, it did add additional
findings that “certain practices by some labor organizations . . . have the intent or
necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by preventing the free
flow of goods in such commerce through strikes and other forms of industrial
82
unrest.” The amendment further stated that “[t]he elimination of such practices
83
is a necessary condition to the assurance of the rights herein guaranteed.”
Courts’ confusion in interpreting the purpose of the NLRA stems from this
84
addition to the findings clause. Although the Taft-Hartley Act kept the findings
of the importance of collective bargaining to prevent barriers to the stream of
76. Supra Part II.A.
77. 1947 Taft-Hartley Substantive Provisions, supra note 40.
78. See James A. Gross, Conflicting Statutory Purposes: Another Look at Fifty Years of NLRB Law
Making, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 7, 12–13 (1985) (describing the new purpose clause in the NLRA
resulting from the Taft-Hartley amendment, and noting that “[a]s a consequence of all of this, the Taft-Hartley
Act contains conflicting statements of purpose that open the national labor law to conflicting interpretations of
congressional intent”).
79. Id. at 11.
80. Infra Part II.C.1–2. It is important to note that the Taft-Harley Act brought other changes to the
NLRA; however, they are not relevant to the discussion within this Comment.
81. The Wagner Act declaration stated in part:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial
obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when
they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2014).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Gross, supra note 78, at 13 (discussing how the different meanings of the purposes clauses in the
Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act have led to conflicting interpretations of the NLRA).
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commerce, it appears to simultaneously discredit these findings by stating that
85
labor organizations contribute to these obstructions. This resulted in two
interpretations of the NLRA’s purpose: (1) to use unions as a means to encourage
collective bargaining, and (2) to discourage the use of unions because they
86
obstruct the stream of commerce.
2. Addition of Unfair Labor Practices by Labor Organizations
The Taft-Hartley Act also extended potential liability to labor organizations
87
for engaging in unfair labor practices. Originally, the NLRA only contemplated
88
unfair labor practices by employers. The amendment made employers and
89
unions equal under the NLRA. Commentators believe the Wagner Act had not
contemplated unfair labor practices by labor organizations because at the time,
90
they had no power to implement them. However, because Congress enacted the
NLRA with the purpose of empowering unions, it seems likely that Congress
91
considered the implications of the unions’ potential new-found power. Congress
did in fact contemplate curtailing the power of unions, but “rejected this view . . .
on the ground that since labor organizations exist for the purpose of organizing
employees, while employers should not be concerned with questions of
92
organization.”
Ultimately, the Taft-Hartley Act placed the process of collective bargaining
93
under Board regulation. Its enactment reflected the shift in view from a belief
that unions help the “free flow of commerce,” to the view that unions inhibit
94
commerce and that their power needs to be restricted. However, the NLRA as it
stands today still states the original purpose of the Wagner Act—thus, courts
95
should interpret the NLRA consistent with Congress’ intent. Courts should
interpret the addition as simply stating that some labor organization practices
may have the effect of obstructing commerce, resulting in Congress placing

85. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
86. See Gross, supra note 78, at 13.
87. 29 U.S.C. § 158.
88. Jerome S. Wohlmuth & Rhoda P. Krupka, The Taft-Hartley Act and Collective Bargaining, 9 MD. L.
REV. 1, 6 (1948).
89. Guy Farmer, The NLRB: Its Past, Present and Future, 23 TENN. L. REV. 112, 113–14 (1954).
90. Id.
91. See Cox, supra note 39, at 24–25 (“[W]hen the Wagner bill was before Congress, it was argued that
labor organizations should be prohibited to the same extent as employers from interfering with, coercing, and
restraining employees in the exercise of their rights.”).
92. Id.
93. Wohlmuth & Krupka, supra note 88, at 2.
94. Supra Part II.C.1.
95. Dannin, supra note 66, at 262–63.
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limitations on labor practices by labor organizations. This finding can coexist
with Senator Wagner’s policy goals, as Congress’ preservation of the original
97
purpose clause in the NLRA demonstrates.
98
The Taft-Hartley Act changed courts’ interpretation of the NLRA, but the
conservation of the original purpose clause demonstrates that meaningful
99
collective bargaining is still an important policy behind the NLRA. TaftHartley’s NLRA purpose clause addition does not undermine the importance of
100
collective bargaining and its necessity to keep the economy balanced. The
NLRA’s purpose is to promote meaningful collective bargaining between
employees and employers; this finding justifies the importance of empowering
101
employees of franchisees with collective bargaining power.
III. THE BUSINESS-FORMAT MODEL AND WHY IT SHOULD BE REGULATED
UNDER THE NLRA
Two predominant franchise business models exist: (1) the traditional
102
franchise and (2) the business-format franchise. Generally, the traditional
103
franchise involves sale of a final good from franchisors to franchisees.
Franchisors with a business-format franchise model offer an entire business104
format to their franchisees. Therefore, the two differ in how much guidance the
105
franchisee gets from the franchisor when it purchases a franchise. Because of
the larger amount of guidance in the business-format franchise, franchisors
directly and indirectly make employment decisions regarding the employees of
106
the franchisees. Thus, franchisors make these decisions without any legal

96. See id. at 262 (stating that the Taft-Hartley Act should be read as “exist[ing] within the framework of
the NLRA rights”).
97. 1947 Taft-Hartley Substantive Provisions, supra note 40.
98. See Cox, supra note 39, at 45 (stating that “[t]he greatest danger in the amendments, however, lies
less in the actual changes in the statute than in the philosophy on which they are based”).
99. See 1947 Taft-Hartley Substantive Provisions, supra note 40 (demonstrating that the original findings
clause is still intact).
100. See Dannin, supra note 66, at 262–63 (noting that the Taft-Hartley amendment should not be read as
undermining the original policy goals of the NLRA).
101. See infra Part III.B.
102. Francine Lafontaine & Roger D. Blair, Article: The Evolution of Franchising and Franchise
Contracts: Evidence from the United States, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 381, 383–84 (2009).
103. Id. at 385.
104. Byron E. Fox & Henry C. Su, Franchise Regulation—Solutions in Search of Problems?, 20 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 241, 249 (1995).
105. See Lafontaine & Blair, supra note 102, at 385 (2009) (describing a traditional franchise). But see
Fox & Su, supra note 104, at 249 (1995) (describing a business-format franchise).
106. See Amicus Brief of General Counsel, supra note 5, at 14–15 (stating that franchises presently
exercise more control over franchisees, such that they are a necessary party to meaningful collective
bargaining).

151

2015 / The Right of Franchise Employees to Union Representation
107

responsibility for labor violations under the current joint employer doctrine.
Because franchisors are not considered employers of the franchisees’ employees,
the franchisee employees do not have a chance to discuss the parameters of their
employment with the franchisors the parties that truly control the labor
108
decisions. Consequently, the franchisee employees are left without the ability
to engage in meaningful collective bargaining that the NLRA guarantees to
109
them. This is why the design of business-format franchises warrants the judicial
declaration such franchisors’ statuses as joint employer.
A. The Business-Format Franchise
In the business-format franchise, “a franchisor, instead of merely licensing
the right to distribute and sell a branded product, offers a complete ‘businessformat’ to its franchisees for a substantial fee, with the franchisees bearing most
110
of the business development costs.” The distinction between the traditional
franchise and the business-format franchise is that franchisors of a traditional
franchise simply offer a trademarked product, whereas business-format
111
franchisors offer a product as well as the marketing and business scheme. The
business-format is advantageous to franchisees because it lowers the costs of
112
entering the market. Those who want to enter a franchise deal know that the
113
public is familiar with the product or service they are going to offer. The
business-format franchise is also advantageous to franchisors because the
franchisees are familiar with the local economy, which makes it more likely that
114
the franchises will be profitable. For example, McDonald’s affords people the
opportunity to enter the market with a product and service that has been
115
successful with the public. McDonald’s, the franchisor, also benefits from the

107. See id. (noting that under the current joint employer definition, franchisors are not held liable for
labor violations of their franchisees employees).
108. See Richard F. Griffin, Jr., Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Lab. Rel. Bd., Keynote Address at West Virginia
University College of Law’s Labor Law Conference: Zealous Advocacy for Social Change (Oct. 24, 2014),
available at http://wvulaw.mediasite.com/Mediasite/Play/31e143f0990647558b0268e9086ca3e4 [hereinafter
Keynote Address at WVU] (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review) (stating that McDonald’s
employees are sent home as a result of a decision made by franchisors).
109. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2014) (stating the findings clause of the NLRA and its purpose to promote
meaningful collective bargaining).
110. Fox & Su, supra note 104, at 249.
111. See Lafontaine & Blair, supra note 102, at 385 (describing a traditional franchise). But see Fox &
Su, supra note 104, at 249 (describing a business-format franchise).
112. Fox & Su, supra note 104, at 252.
113. Id. at 252 (“The business-format generally results in lower risks of small business failure because the
franchisee establishes and operates his business in strict conformance with the format”).
114. Id. at 251.
115. See id. at 252 (stating generally how business format franchises work and that McDonald’s is an
example of one).
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franchisee’s localized knowledge of the market. This guaranteed profitability
117
allows the franchise to expand rapidly. The business-format model offers
118
potential for large profits to both parties, which explains its growing popularity.
B. The Business-Format Franchise and the NLRA
Though the concept for the business-format model developed in the 1890s, it
did not become popular until the 1950sCfifteen years after Congress enacted the
119
NLRA. This begs the question of whether Congress would have intended the
NLRA to cover modern business-format franchisors as employers had they
existed in 1935.
Congress enacted the NLRA to provide workers with a way to collectively
120
bargain with employers. Wagner wanted the Act to adapt as the marketplace
121
changed. Even though labor problems today are not identical to those in the
1930s, the continuous strikes over the last two years by fast food workers
demonstrate worker dissatisfaction resembling the industrial strife in existence
when Congress enacted the NLRA: both stemming from a lack of worker
122
recognition. Therefore, it seems likely that Congress intended the NLRA to
encompass the modern franchise because employees of franchisees should be
enabled to collectively bargain with franchisors.
C. The Business-Format Franchise and the NLRA after the Taft-Hartley Act
Although courts began interpreting the NLRA as if the Taft-Hartley Act
weakened the importance of collective bargaining, the amendment left the
123
statement of the importance of collective bargaining in the NLRA. The TaftHartley Act added that some labor organization practices negatively impact
124
interstate commerce. However, Congress knew and contemplated the fact that
125
strikes obstruct interstate commerce. In fact, NLRA legislators recognized
126
collective bargaining as a solution to strikes. Studies had shown that strikes

116. Id.
117. Id. at 251.
118. See Lafontaine & Blair, supra note 102, at 386 (stating that the business-format franchise became
popular in the US and Canada, and eventually all over the world).
119. Id. at 385–86. See also National Labor Relations Act, supra note 32.
120. Supra Part II.
121. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
122. See Cox, supra note 39, at 2 (noting that strikes resulted from a lack of collective bargaining and
non-recognition by employers).
123. Gross, supra note 78, at 11.
124. 1947 Taft-Hartley Substantive Provisions, supra note 40.
125. Cox, supra note 39, at 3.
126. See id. (stating that Congress had recognized through a study in 1894 that “interference with
employee organization and denials of recognition were prime causes of industrial disputes”).
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resulted from workers frustrated by their lack of recognition from employers.
This is why NLRA legislators encouraged collective bargaining as a means to
128
increase employers’ worker recognition and, in turn, to reduce strikes. Under
this interpretation, the Taft-Hartley Act aligns perfectly with the original intent of
129
the NRLA and the importance of collective bargaining still stands strong.
D. Franchisors Manipulating the Business-Format Franchise to Avoid Labor
Violations

The franchise business-format model promotes rapid expansion of
130
companies. The difference today is that the franchise model allegedly leaves all
131
employment decisions to the franchisees.
Franchisors claim no legal
responsibility to collectively bargain with employees of franchisees because they
132
have no control over working conditions in the franchises. The model only
allows employees to produce a company’s product and wear the company’s
133
symbols. Franchisors state that franchisees make the employment decisions for
their workers, and the franchisee’s control is generally enough to separate
134
liability of the franchisor. This may be true of the traditional franchise, where
franchisees are simply provided with a product; but with a business-format
franchise where the franchisor provides a franchisee with an entire model of how
to do business, the idea that the franchisor has no control over employment is far135
fetched. The General Counsel of the NLRB, Richard Griffin, confirmed this
finding by stating that the modern franchises exert more control over their
136
employees than franchisors exercised in previous decisions. The level of
control franchisors exert over franchisees and their employees is so great that
137
franchisors have become an indispensable party to any. Griffin also suggests
that rapid expansion of the modern franchise model may be partially attributed to
the fact that franchisors embraced the ability to indirectly control employment

127. See Keyserling, supra note 33, at 218 (explaining Wagner’s intent when enacting the NLRA).
128. See id. (explaining Wagner’s understanding of workers frustration with lack of recognition).
129. See 1947 Taft-Hartley Substantive Provisions, supra note 40 (stating the intent of the Taft-Hartley
Act was to stop obstructive labor organization practices).
130. Fox & Su, supra note 104, at 251.
131. Amicus Brief of General Counsel, supra note 5, at 14.
132. Id. at 14–15.
133. Fox & Su, supra note 104, at 251.
134. See Amicus Brief of General Counsel, supra note 5, at 14–15 (stating that the General Counsel does
not wish to overturn decisions where control of franchisors exercised over franchisees is to ensure brand
quality).
135. See id. (recognizing they did not have the intent to overrule franchise decisions in which control was
to protect brand quality). See Part IV.D.2 for a more in-depth analysis of a joint employer standard being
applied to a traditional franchise.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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matters without the liability of labor violations. These findings solidify the
conclusion that the enactors of the NLRA would have meant for the Act to
encompass the modern business-format franchise.
E. The NLRB’s Decision to Establish McDonald’s as a Joint Employer Reflects
the Original Intent of the NLRA
During a keynote speech to law students at West Virginia University, Griffin
gave insight into the Board’s decision to establish McDonald’s as a joint
139
employer. He stated that McDonald’s has more everyday involvement with its
140
franchisees than most other franchises. Software has made it possible to
141
monitor various activities in the franchises at any given time. Griffin gave an
example of how McDonald’s monitors the number of customers being served and
142
employees working. The software contains algorithms that tell the franchisor
when a particular franchise is not cost efficient and the franchisee has “to start
143
sending [employees] home.”
If an employee is sent home because the franchisor’s software determined it
was the most cost-effective way to do business that day, any negotiating the
employee does with the franchisee will not affect that decision, because it was
144
not the franchisees’ decision―it was the franchisor’s. Senator Wagner often
145
stated that the purpose of the NLRA was “to make the worker a free man.”
When a worker is told to go home and is powerless to change the decision,
146
Senator Wagner’s goal, and the purpose of the NLRA, is not met. Every worker
deserves the opportunity to engage in collective bargaining and reserve some
147
autonomy in the workplace.
F. Why Franchises Do Not Want to be Held Jointly Liable for Labor Violations
Franchises fear the NLRB’s decision finding McDonald’s a joint employer
with its franchisees, because of the consequences the decision brings to all

138. Id.
139. Keynote Address at WVU, supra note 108.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See Amicus Brief of General Counsel, supra note 5, at 14–15 (stating that the franchise model
exercises control over employees, but does not allow them to collectively bargain with those that are making
their employment decisions).
145. Keyserling, supra note 33, at 215.
146. Id. at 215–16.
147. See Cox, supra note 39, at 3 (stating that strikes increase when workers are not recognized by
employers).
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modern business-format franchises. If courts determine that McDonald’s is a
joint employer, then it will be held jointly liable for any labor violations the
149
franchisees commit. As a result, franchisors believe they will have to make
150
business changes that will ultimately undermine the entire franchise model.
However, if the current franchise system developed to allow franchisors to retain
control over franchisees’ employees without being amenable to suits under the
NLRA, as suggested above, workers’ rights will better be protected if the
151
franchise system operates differently.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JOINT EMPLOYER DOCTRINE
The NLRA includes in its definition of employer, “any person acting as an
152
agent of an employer.” Whether a franchisee is an agent of the franchisor is a
153
complex question that has led courts to develop the joint employer doctrine.
The Board would have to establish that the franchisor and franchisee are joint
employers before a franchisor could be liable to franchise employees for alleged
154
labor violations. The National Labor Relations Board developed its current
155
definition of ‘joint employer’ in both TLI and Laerco:
The joint employer concept recognizes that two or more business entities
are in fact separate but that they share or codetermine those matters
governing the essential terms and conditions of employment. Whether an
employer possesses sufficient indicia of control over petitioned-for
employees employed by another employer is essentially a factual issue.
To establish joint employer status there must be a showing that the
employer meaningfully affects matters relating to the employment
relationship such as hiring, firing, discipline, supervision, and
156
direction.

148. See Trottman & Jargon, supra note 19 (stating that McDonald’s plans to contest the joint employer
allegations against them as they are improperly placed).
149. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2014) (stating the forbidden practices of employers).
150. Trottman & Jargon, supra note 19.
151. See Amicus Brief of General Counsel, supra note 5, at 5 (stating that there is a possibility the
franchise model has developed into what it is today to avoid potential labor violations).
152. 29 U.S.C. § 152.
153. See id. (not defining joint employer); see also Laerco Transp. and Warehouse, 269 N.L.R.B. 324,
325 (1984) (referring to joint employer issue and not mentioning the NLRA).
154. See McGuire, supra note 20, at 238–39 (discussing the jurisdictional element of the NLRB’s power
to find a franchisor violated an employee of a franchisees rights under the NLRA requires a finding that the
franchisee and the franchisor are joint employers).
155. TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798, 798 (1984); Laerco Transp. and Warehouse, 269 N.L.R.B. at 325.
156. Laerco Transp. and Warehouse, 269 N.L.R.B. at 324.
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To be considered a joint employer, the narrow standard requires actual, direct
157
control by both employers over the employees. The General Counsel of the
NLRB proposed a switch to an older definition of joint employer as an attempt to
158
steer away from the new, stricter, standard of joint employer. However, both
159
definitions require a case-by-case analysis.
A. Tracing the Roots of the Doctrine
The initial uses of the joint employer doctrine helped determine whether
employees of franchises were able to effectively unionize, either at the term’s
inception, or under the traditional definition of joint employer. The Board has to
find a franchisor to be a “‘joint employer’ within the meaning of the National
Labor Relations Act [for the franchisor] to be liable for a violation of the
160
161
NLRA.” The term, however, is not actually used in the NLRA. The National
Labor Relations Board developed its current definition of “joint employer” from
162
two cases decided in 1984: TLI and Laerco. In those two cases, the definition
163
of joint employer was supported by multiple cases. Two other decisions,
164
165
Condenser and Hod Carriers have been cited as support for finding a joint
166
employer relationship, but neither actually uses the term. Therefore, it is likely
that these two cases were decided before the term was popularly used to
167
determine employer status under the NLRA. Condenser and Hod Carriers help
explain how courts initially examined factual situations that would trigger a joint
168
employer analysis in courts today.

157. See id. at 325 (“There must be a showing that the employer meaningfully affects matters relating to
the employment relationship.”).
158. Amicus Brief of General Counsel, supra note 5, at 16–17.
159. See id. at 4 (“determining joint-employer status has always been a factual issue regardless of how the
Board has defined the standard.”).
160. N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1119 (3d Cir. 1982).
161. 29 U.S.C. § 152.
162. See TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798 (1984) (stating the current definition of joint employer); see also
Laerco Transp. and Warehouse, 269 N.L.R.B. 324 (1984) (stating the current definition of joint employer).
163. See TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. at 802 (citing N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117,
1119 (3d Cir. 1982) and Laerco Transp. and Warehouse, 269 N.L.R.B. 324 (1984)) (using the standards created
by the cited cases when stating its joint employer definition).
164. N.L.R.B. v. Condenser Corp. of Am., 128 F.2d 67, 71 (3d. Cir. 1942).
165. Hod Carriers Local 300 (Austin Co.), 101 N.L.R.B. 197 (1952).
166. See Condenser Corp., 128 F.2d at 67 (not using the term joint-employer); see also Hod Carriers,
101 N.L.R.B. 197 (1952) (also not using the term joint-employer).
167. See Condenser Corp., 128 F.2d at 67.
168. See infra Part IV.C.
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B. Analyses of Condenser and Hod Carriers
In Condenser, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals confronted the problem of
169
two separate corporations charged with violations under the NLRA. The Board
sought to enforce an earlier labor violation ruling against Condenser and
170
Cornell—Condenser being a “wholly owned subsidiary of Cornell.” Cornell
acquired materials and sold them to Condenser, who in turn produced goods that
171
Cornell would purchase and sell on the market. Cornell alleged that the
corporation was not a proper target in the suit because they were “not an
172
employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Labor Relations Act.” The
173
court disagreed with this argument. The court found that because the company
constituted one enterprise in the distribution of their products, the relative
174
arrangement of the employees between the two corporations was irrelevant.
The two corporations simultaneously “[acted] as employers of those employees
and together actively [dealt] with labor relations of those employees,’” and thus,
175
both were liable under the NLRA. However, this case was decided before
courts drew the distinction between a “single employer” and a “joint
176
employer.”
The present day establishment of the “‘single employer’
relationship exists where two nominally separate entities are actually part of a
single integrated enterprise so that, for all purposes, there is in fact only a ‘single
177
employer.’” If that distinction existed at the time Condenser was decided, it
would instead fall under a “single employer” rather than a “joint employer”
178
analysis.
In Hod Carriers, the Board found an independent company liable for
179
violations of the NRLA. Austin, a construction company, contracted with
180
Pinkerton to supply guards for a construction project. Employees of Austin,
who were also members of the Local 300 union, objected to the presence of the
181
guards because they were not a part of Local 300. In response, Austin cancelled
169. Condenser Corp., 128 F.2d at 71.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines Inc., 303 U.S. 261, 263 (1938)).
176. See N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1122 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that there
has been “a blurring of concepts” regarding the concepts of ‘single employer’ and ‘joint employer’).
177. Id.
178. See id. (using the same language of ‘single integrated enterprise’ to describe ‘single employer’ as
was used to describe the relationship between Condenser and Cornell); see also Condenser Corp. of Am., 128
F.2d at 71 (describing the relationship between Condenser and Cornell as one “where in fact the production and
distribution of merchandise is one enterprise”).
179. Austin Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1257, 1258 (1952).
180. Id.
181. Id.
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182

the contract with Pinkerton. The Pinkerton guards filed suit against Austin for
183
violating the NLRA. Austin responded that the NLRA only applied to them in
184
relation to their own employees. However, the Board looked at the construction
185
of the NLRA and found to the contrary. They held that while particular sections
of the NLRA did restrict application to employers and their respective
employees, section 8(a)(3) did not restrict application of the statute to employers
in this manner; therefore, the NLRA was applicable, even though the guards were
186
not employees of Austin.
The Board recognized that Austin had to terminate the employment contract
187
because the guards assigned were not affiliated with the Local 300 union. In
affirming the Trial Examiner’s holding that Austin was amenable to suit under
the NLRA, the Board “did not adopt his broad rationale to the effect that conduct
of any employer which results in coercion of any employee necessarily
188
constitutes unfair labor practice.” The Board restricted its finding to section
(a)(3) because the statutory language does not include a restriction specific to
189
“[the employer’s] employees.” However, other sections, notably section
190
(a)(5), do limit application to “[the employer’s] employees,” making it unlikely
191
that this case’ would apply to those sections of the NLRA.
The statutory construction analysis used in Hod Carriers would not turn out
well for employees of franchisees attempting to unionize for the purpose of
192
collective bargaining. The Board specifically rejected the use of section (a)(5),
which forbids employers “to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative
193
of his employees.” The guards were not considered employees, so the Board
would not honor a case where the Pinkerton guards tried to collectively bargain
194
with Austin. Presently, franchisors are not considered employers of their
195
franchisees’ employees. Therefore, under Hod Carrier’s reasoning, it would be
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1258–59.
186. Id. at 1259.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1260.
189. Id. at 1259; 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(3) (2014).
190. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(5) states “to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees.”
191. Austin Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1257, 1259 (1952) (noting that the Board was limiting the Trial Examiners
decision).
192. See id. (finding Austin guilty of violation of NLRA because section 158 (a)(3) does not restrict
violations to “[employer’s employees]”).
193. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(5) (emphasis added); Austin Co., 101 N.L.R.B. at 1259.
194. See id. (pointing out that 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(5) does restrict to “[employer’s employees],” making it
unlikely that it would extend their holding to a collective bargaining case).
195. See Daniel Fisher, California Supreme Court Rejects Obama Administration Theory on Franchise
Employees, FORBES (Aug. 28, 2014), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/08/28/
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impossible for employees of franchisees to collectively bargain with franchisors
without a new definition of “joint employer.”
C. Interim Developments: The Board’s Decision in Browning-Ferris and Why
This Standard is Favorable, but Will Not Help Employees of Franchisees to
Unionize
Under the traditional standard, as set forth by the General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board:
196

[A]n entity was a joint employer where it exercised direct or indirect
control over significant terms and conditions of employment of another
entity’s employees; where it possessed the unexercised potential to
control such terms and conditions of employment; or where ‘industrial
realities’ otherwise made it an essential party to meaningful collective
197
bargaining.
The Board, in deciding Browning-Ferris in 2015, called for amici to brief on
the question of whether the Board should return to the traditional standard, or
198
continue to adhere to the standard as laid out in TLI and Laerco. In his Amicus
Brief to the Board, the General Counsel stated his intent to reinstate the
199
traditional standard for determining joint employer status. The traditional
200
standard is relatively broad in comparison to the current standard. Congress
enacted the NLRA with the intent that courts would interpret the term
201
“employer” broadly. The General Counsel asserted that the best way to achieve
202
these goals is to return to the traditional standard.
The Brief addressed current problems in meaningful collective bargaining,
203
one of which is the franchise model. This showed that the General Counsel
intends to allow collective bargaining between franchisees’ employees and
204
franchisors. The Board appeared to adopt the General Counsel’s position and
california-supreme-court-rejects-obama-administration-theory-on-franchise-employees/ (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the California Supreme Court’s recent rejection of the
franchisor Domino’s being responsible for the act of an employee of one of its franchisees).
196. Note that under the current definition, control must be direct. See Laerco Transp. and Warehouse,
269 N.L.R.B. at 325 (1984) (“There must be a showing that the employer meaningfully affects matters relating
to the employment relationship.”).
197. Amicus Brief of General Counsel, supra note 5, at 4–5.
198. Browning-Ferris Industries, __ N.L.R.B. __, Case 32-RC-109684, 1.
199. Id. at 17.
200. See id. at 4 (stating that the current definition is much narrower than the traditional approach).
201. Id. at 9–10.
202. Id. at 4.
203. Id. at 14.
204. See Amicus Brief of General Counsel, supra note 5, at 14–15 (stating that the current amount of
control exerted over franchises essentially allows franchisors to control employees of franchisees).

160

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 47
found that the expansion of workplace arrangements warranted revisiting the
205
joint employer standard. The Board stated that it may find a joint employer
relationship exists if “two or more entities are joint employers of a single work
206
force if they are both employers within the meaning of the common law, and if
they share or codetermine those matters governing the essential terms and
207
conditions of employment.” The Board detailed that it “will no longer require
that a joint employer not only possess the authority to control employees’ terms
and conditions of employment, but must also exercise that authority, and do so
208
directly, immediately, and not in a ‘limited and routine’ manner.” The Board
then expressly stated that it overruled TLI and Laerco, as well as any other Board
209
decisions to the extent that they are inconsistent with their current ruling.
However, the Board then stated, “[t]he existence, extent, and object of a putative
210
joint employer’s control, of course, all may present material issues.” The Board
211
applied the new standard to the facts presented in the case. This suggests that
the Board will continue to use a case-by-case analysis.
Although the new broader standard will likely classify the McDonald’s
franchisor-franchisee relationship as a joint employer relationship, the case-bycase factual determination will make unionization efforts difficult for franchisee
212
employees. The problem with using a case-by-case analysis to establish a union
is that before employees of a franchisee will be able to establish a legal right to
collectively bargain with a franchisor, they will have to establish that the
213
franchise they work for is a joint employer with the franchisor. Most franchises
use standardized contracts, with almost no difference in form from franchise to
214
franchise. The identical contracts may make it easier to present a case, but there
215
are factors besides the contracts that are examined under the analysis as well.
When other factors are present, it will be easier for large franchisors to draw out

205. Browning-Ferris Industries at 11.
206. The opinion details that under common law standards, “the right to control is probative of an
employment relationship―whether or not that right is exercised.” Id. at 13. The opinion discusses several
restatements, and then states that the courts, in imposing the traditional standards, have always imposed a
common law employment relationship definition. Id. at 13–14.
207. Id. at 15.
208. Id. at 15–16.
209. Id. at 16.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 18–20.
212. See id. (stating that different cases present “material issues”).
213. See McGuire, supra note 20, at 239 (explaining that the threshold question is “whether or not the
franchisor will be characterized as an employer of the interest group which the union seeks to represent”).
214. Lafontaine & Blair, supra note 102.
215. See Amicus Brief of General Counsel, supra note 5, at 16–17 (stating that to find joint employer
status, the Board should look at “the totality of the circumstances, including the way the separate entities have
structured their commercial relationship”).
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litigation using minor discrepancies between franchises. Therefore, any
definition of joint employer that involves a case-by-case analysis will make
217
unionizing unnecessarily difficult for employees of all franchisees.
V. THE NEED FOR A FRANCHISE-BY-FRANCHISE DOCTRINE
Part III of this Comment established that, under the original intent of the
NLRA, meaningful collective bargaining needs to take place between franchisors
218
and employees of franchisees in modern franchises. The traditional standard the
General Counsel presented as the solution to foster collective bargaining is not
219
sufficient because it does not allow union formation. Unions and labor
organizations are vital for employees engaging in the collective bargaining
220
process. The joint employer definition should still be based on the totality of
the circumstances and indirect effect tests, but instead of requiring a case-by-case
analysis, the definition should require a franchise-by-franchise analysis. This Part
will define the franchise-by-franchise doctrine and then apply it to a traditional
221
franchise, a business-format franchise, and a distributorship.
A. The Franchise-by-Franchise Analysis Doctrine
The franchise-by-franchise doctrine will encompass the same factors used in
the Browning-Ferris decision: (1) whether the franchisors are exercising any kind
of control over the employees of franchisees and (2) whether there is “potential
222
to control terms and conditions of employment.” Employees will have the
burden to show that the franchisor exercises enough control such that meaningful
223
collective bargaining cannot occur without the involvement of the franchisor. If
the employees are able to prove control is strong enough to establish a joint
employer relationship, the joint employer relationship will be applied throughout
the entire franchise. This means that every franchisee in the franchise would be
considered a joint employer with the franchisor.

216. See Trottman & Jargon, supra note 19 (stating that McDonald’s plans to contest the joint employer
allegations against them, as they are improperly placed).
217. See supra Part IV.C.
218. Supra Part III.C.
219. Supra Part IV.C.
220. Dannin, supra note 66, at 251.
221. Infra Part V.A.
222. Browning-Ferris Industries, __ N.L.R.B. __, Case 32-RC-109684, 1, 13–15.
223. Application of a three-factor test will demonstrate how much control is necessary to develop a joint
employer relationship. See infra Part V.B.
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B. Applying the Franchise-By-Franchise Doctrine
The franchise-by-franchise doctrine will be applied to three different types of
franchises: a traditional franchise, a business-format franchise, and a
distributorship. The doctrine applied to a traditional franchise demonstrates a
middle-ground where a joint employer designation will depend on the factual
224
scenario. The doctrine applied to a business-format franchise will generally
225
return a joint employer finding. The doctrine applied to a distributorship, a
franchise that typically has no contractual support or training from its
226
227
franchisor, generally will not result in a joint employer relationship.
1. Application of the Doctrine to a Traditional Franchise
228

A car dealership is the quintessential traditional franchise. In the traditional
franchise, “the franchisor is a manufacturer who sells finished or semi-finished
products to its franchisees . . . [i]n turn, the franchisees resell these products to
229
consumers or other firms in the distribution chain.” Franchisors retain control
over various elements of the business, such as requiring a certain number of cars
to be sold, requiring only parts from the manufacturer to be stocked at the
230
dealership, and the overall appearance of the franchised store. However,
because the dealership is receiving a final product, the necessity for franchisors
231
to control aspects of the franchisee dealership is minimal. Brand quality is
232
assured because the franchisor manufactures the product.
Applying the first factor of the proposed joint employer test, which questions
whether the franchisor has exercised any control over the franchisee,
demonstrates a low level of control. The franchisor does not control the
employees at the dealership; it merely maintains control over the appearance of

224. See infra Part V.B.1.
225. See infra Part V.B.2.
226. See BARBARA BESHEL, IFA EDUC. FOUND., AN INTRODUCTION TO FRANCHISING (2010), available
at http://www.franchise.org/uploadedFiles/Franchise_Industry/Resources/Education_Foundation/introtofranch
ising_final.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (stating that a distributorship is an
alternative to franchising).
227. See infra Part V.B.3.
228. See Lafontaine & Blair, supra note 102, at 385 (“[T]raditional franchising in the United States is
comprised largely of automobile dealerships, gasoline service stations, and soft-drink bottlers).
229. Id.
230. See Friedrich Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66 YALE L.
J. 1135, 1140–45 (discussing the amount of control that franchisors used to have over automobile dealerships,
and how that amount has decreased).
231. See Lafontaine & Blair, supra note 102, at 385 (stating that traditional franchises typically receive
the final product from the franchisor).
232. See Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and the Collective Rights of Franchisees, 43 VAND. L. REV.
1203, 1528 (1990) (stating that brand quality is still a legitimate reason for franchisors to direct control over
franchisees).
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the dealership. Applying the second factor, regarding the capability of the
franchisor to exercise control over the employees of the franchisee, weighs
against a joint employer finding as well. Generally, dealership contracts do not
234
contain clauses allowing the franchisor to control any aspect of employment. In
fact, franchisors intentionally keep clauses giving a franchisors’ right to control
franchisees’ employees out of the contracts because they do not want to be
235
responsible for labor violations. Although it is unlikely that any franchise
236
contract, including business-format contracts, contain such a clause, the
relevant distinction lies in the control necessary to maintain brand quality. In the
traditional franchise, the need is low because the product has already been
237
made.
Employees may bring in evidence showing the way the entities have chosen
238
to structure their relationship as well. If there is sufficient evidence that the
franchisor controls aspects of franchise employee’s employment, the franchise
will be deemed a joint employer. Once this declaration is made, the franchisor
will be a joint employer with all of its franchisees. Therefore, under a broad
definition of joint employer combined with application of the franchise-byfranchise doctrine, all employees of a traditional franchise will be able to
unionize and collectively bargain with the franchisor.
2. Application of these Factors to the McDonald’s Cases
The application of the first factor of the test comes out strongly in favor of
the employees in the McDonald’s cases. The General Counsel unearthed
evidence that McDonald’s would monitor business in real time and tell
franchisees immediately how many employees to have on duty when business
239
was slow. This is a perfect example of a franchisor exercising control over the
employment of franchisees’ employees. The second factor, as stated above, will
240
generally come out in favor of the franchise. The franchise will always shy
away from including any kind of contract clause that grants them control over

233. See BESHEL, supra note 226; see also Amicus Brief of General Counsel, supra note 5, at 4–5 (stating
what traditional franchises typically exert control over).
234. Kessler, supra note 230, at 1140–45.
235. See Lafontaine & Blair, supra note 102, at 385 (stating that franchises know that clauses directly
affecting employment of employees of franchisees will make them liable for employment violations).
236. Id.
237. See BESHEL, supra note 226 (stating that product distribution franchises, another common name for
traditional franchises, simply distribute the franchisors finished product).
238. Browning-Ferris Industries, __ N.L.R.B. __, Case 32-RC-109684, 1, 13, n. 68.
239. See Keynote Address at WVU, supra note 108 (stating that McDonald’s employees are sent home as
a result of a decision made by franchisors).
240. See supra Part IV.D.2.
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aspects of franchise employment because they are aware this may expose them to
241
liability.
However, due to the structure of the arrangement, it is clear that the
franchisor has the opportunity to exercise control over the franchisees employees.
McDonald’s, the franchisor, called franchisees and told them to send some of
242
243
their employees home. Franchise owners then sent their employees home.
These employees cannot meaningfully bargain with franchisee owners to change
this practice because it is not the franchisee owner making the decision, it is the
244
franchisor. The only way these employees can change the conditions of their
employment is to negotiate with the franchisors. Therefore, McDonald’s should
be designated as a joint employer with all of its franchisees.
McDonald’s is now clearly established as a joint employer with the
franchisees that brought these cases under the franchise-by-franchise doctrine.
The joint employer designation is justified here because McDonald’s
demonstrated its ability to control aspects of franchise employment decisions.
This control needs to be balanced with the employees’ ability to collectively
bargain with the franchisor. Because McDonald’s ability to control has been
established, the workers’ right to be protected through union representation need
to be established. Thus, all employees of McDonald’s franchisees will be able to
collectively bargain with the franchisor.
3. Application to a Distributorship
A distributorship is a franchise that generally has no contractual support or
245
training from its franchisor. Because distributorships do not require a
storefront, they generally do not need as much guidance as a traditional or
246
business-format franchise. Distributorship contracts between the franchisor and
247
the franchisee only specify amounts of goods to be purchased. Because
franchisors do not exercise control over franchisees in distributorship contracts,
there is no joint employer relationship.

241. See Trottman & Jargon, supra note 19 (stating that McDonald’s plans to contest the joint employer
allegations against them as they are improperly placed, demonstrating their fear of being held liable for labor
violations).
242. See Keynote Address at WVU, supra note 108.
243. Id.
244. See supra Part III.D.
245. See BESHEL, supra note 226 (stating that a distributorship is an alternative to franchising).
246. See id. (stating that distributorships are generally companies such as Amway and Color Me Beautiful
Cosmetics).
247. See Mack Mitsheva, Difference Between a Franchise & a Distribution Agreement, HOUSTON
CHRON., available at http://smallbusiness.chron.com/difference-between-franchise-distribution-agreement41153.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (stating that
distributorships do not have control over the way products are sold).
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VI. CONCLUSION
There is clearly worker dissatisfaction under the current franchise model;
there have been multiple strikes in the last few years because of employment
248
conditions. The strikers are not just demanding higher wages; they are
249
demanding the ability to unionize. Congress enacted the NLRA to grant these
250
rights to employees.
The General Counsel’s intent to allow collective bargaining for franchisee
251
employees is clear. This is further reflected in the Board’s new decision in
Browning-Ferris, which emphasized that one of the reasons for a broader joint
252
employer standard is the ever evolving structure of workplace arrangements.
The only problem in its effort to empower workers of franchises is that the new
definition of joint employer will make it difficult for franchisee employee’s to
253
unionize. Any definition that continues to use a factual determination of joint
employer status that will be ineffective in unionization efforts because of the
difficulty posed by individually labeling each franchise a joint employer with its
franchise. With the franchise-by-franchise doctrine, the goal of unionization is
within reach. Once the ability to control is demonstrated over one franchisee, the
franchisors’ ability to control all of their franchisees is apparent. The franchiseby-franchise doctrine compensates for this ability to control by empowering
employees of franchisees to unionize, and thus, to collectively bargain with their
respective franchisors.

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
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Greenhouse, supra note 1.
Id.
Supra Part III.
Browning-Ferris Industries, __ N.L.R.B. __, Case 32-RC-109684, 1, 11.
Id.
Supra Part IV.D.

